The recent Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command leak exposed a fleet of 21 vessels used for IRGC oil deliveries. The database presents evidence of all the classic Shadow Fleet techniques, from STS transfers to oil rebranding, and even “Trojan tanker”-level identity manipulation.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the backbone of the Iranian regime and a terrorist organization designated since 2007, was widely exposed by the US Treasury for its illicit and covert international oil export mechanism in July 2025. It was revealed how the IRGC facilitates an intricate web of commerce, using its own Turkish-based front company, Golden Globe Demir Celik Petrol (GDCP) to secretly funnel and sell oil, generating hundreds of millions in profits. In recent leak exposing both Nosazan Kaveh and GDCP, major evidence has surfaced, revealing how GDCP is still exporting oil via a fleet of 21 vessels. These tankers are a crucial part of the clandestine mechanism, built upon layers of shell corporations and falsified documents, enabling the funding of the IRGC's global terror activities. Out of the 21 vessels identified in the materials, 17 were already under US sanctions at the time of use:

To circumvent sanctions while using sanctioned vessels, the IRGC's oil export scheme heavily relies on STS transfers, fabrication of oil origins, and manipulation of vessel identities. The same tactics have been employed by the Armed Forces General Staff’s (AFGS) affiliated petroleum trading arm, Sepehr Energy Jahan(SEJ). It must be underscored that the vessels’ masters, shipping companies and agents knowingly collude with GDCP by helping disguise its oil as legitimate trade. The IRGC primarily facilitates its illegal oil exports through ship-to-ship (STS) transfer operations: Oil is loaded onto sanctioned “mother” vessels at Kharg Island Port in Iran, which then transit to the coasts off of Singapore or Malaysia, where they anchor and conduct STS transfers to often, though not always, non-sanctioned "daughter" vessels. These “daughter” vessels then proceed to Chinese ports, such as Dongying or Dalian, where the oil is offloaded and delivered to the final customer.

Ilustration of the ship-to-ship (STS) transfer proccess

Case Study: MT Taurus (Eternal Peace) and MT CS Aura

A prominent example of the IRGC implementing this classic STS transfer operation involves sanctioned vessel MT Taurus (formerly Eternal Peace, IMO: 9259745) and non-sanctioned vessel MT CS Aura (IMO: 9225081). In February 2025, the MT Taurus loaded one million barrels of crude oil at Kharg Island. It then proceeded to EOPL Singapore, where it transferred its oil cargoes to MT CS Aura. MT CS Aura discharged the oil cargo in Dalian, China. In this deal, the “domestic consignee” was company Jiandi HK Limited, an alias for "Cheng Tuo Group". Jiandi HK Limited is a recently-sanctioned China-based generic front company acting as principal operator in the IRGC's oil trade network. Its primary role is coordinating chartering agreements, vessel operations and port agents in many shipments on behalf of the IRGC. Additionally, Hong Kong Sanmu Limited, another IRGC-affiliated generic front company, was listed as a shipper in this deal, demonstrating the extensive use of multiple front companies to obscure true ownership. As is shown in the attachments below, the STS operation was coordinated with Singapore-based Meras Venus SDN BHD, and the discharge operation was coordinated with port agent China Marine Shipping Agency Liaoning Co Ltd.

Case Study: MT Gagan and MT DF Peak

In parallel to this classic STS operation, the IRGC has also conducted an STS transfer between two sanctioned vessels: MT Gagan and MT DF Peak. In May 2025, the MT Gagan loaded approximately 650,000 barrels of crude oil at Kharg Island and was intended to sail directly to Dongying Port, China. However, due to bureaucratic complications, an STS transfer became necessary. MT DF Peak was instructed to proceed to EOPL Singapore, where it recieved MT Gagan's oil cargoes. In this shipment, the primary operator was **Townaway Industry Co Limited. ** Townaway Industry is another front company that functions similarly to Jiandi HK Limited –serving as the IRGC's intermediary and representative. Townaway Industry coordinated this operation with charterer company Nab Shipping and STS operator Yellow Melilot Services.

In STS transfer operations, it is contractually agreed between the IRGC and the chartering entities to conduct the transfer with a sanctioned “mother” vessel. As part of this agreement, they systemically fabricate Bill of Lading documents, disable AIS tracking per instruction, and sign documents with fictious names of the mother vessels, similar to the “Trojan Tanker” practice we previously examined However, it remains unverified whether the vessel names listed in the documents are actually false, or merely whether the vessel identities are misrepresented. Very often, the vessel names as well as other identifiers that appear on official documents are fabricated to obfuscate of the true nature of the ship and cargo. Attached below is a excerpt of an agreement between Jiandi HK Limited and charterer company Euroship International Trading and Shipping for the chartering of MT Lily. The agreement bluntly permits - and even somewhat instructs - the owners and masters of the ship to use a fake name and falsify legal cargo documents, including bills of lading, cargo manifests, certificates of origin and quality and quantity statements. The manipulation of the documents is done to ensure “smooth cargo operation at the discharge port”:

In most of the IRGC's oil exports, the imported Iranian crude oil is documented as "Malaysian Blend Crude Oil", typically through a Malaysian port agent. In April 2025, MT Atlantis departed directly from an Iranian port and arrived in Dongying, China. In May 2025, vessels MT Hasna and MT Cangjie executed an STS transfer in OPL Singapore; MT Cangjie then proceeded to Dongying as well. Both MT Cangjie and MT Atlantis submitted false documents declaring that they were importing Malaysian Oil. The Malaysian port agent Atlanta Paradise fabricated documents for both of these vessels. The entire process of “Oil Rebranding” has already extensively discussed on a previous article. Attached below is a Letter of Authorization for Atlanta Paradise and a Bill of Lading provided by Atlanta Paradise:

For the discharge phase of these two shipments, the Chinese port agent was China Marine Shipping Agency Shandong:

As demonstrated above, to facilitate the illicit trade of Iranian oil, the IRGC and its network of collaborators fabricate documentation of the vessels' oil origin while leveraging their relationships with port agents to ensure safe import.

Identity Manipulation

In some shipments, port agents instruct the vessel masters to strategically obscure the vessel's IMO and name by painting over them, and to disable AIS tracking systems prior to port entry. These deceptive tactics were implemented by the vessel masters of both MT Cangjie and MT Atlantis after being instructed by their port agent, China Marine Shipping Agency Shandong. Attached is a photo taken by the vessel captain of MT Atlantis, showing the side of the vessel being “painted-over” to hide its name and IMO:

A similar photo was sent by the vessel master of MT Cangjie, showing how identification marks were hidden:

Case Study: MT Bella 1

In January 2026, the Russian-flagged MT Marina, formerly MT Bella 1, was intercepted by US authorities while transferring Venezuelan oil in the Atlantic Ocean. MT Bella 1 has a long-standing, notorious history of exporting Iranian oil on behalf of the Iranian Security apparatus. In fact, the vessel was sanctioned in June 2024 due to its affiliation with Concepto Screen SAL Off-Shore, a company sanctioned for exporting oil on behalf of Lebanese Hezbollah and IRGC-Quds Force. Furthermore, the tanker had continuously serviced SEJ, the AFGS’s trading arm, as exposed in our previous leak. In August 2025, MT Bella 1 loaded two million barrels of IRGC oil. The loading agent at the Iranian port was Sea Speed Company, which sent a service confirmation through its UAE-based company Ocean Allianz LLC, to Atic Energy FZE. Attached below is the service confirmation:

Case Study: MT Petro Ocean

In December 2025, Nosazan Kaveh purchased 700 metric tons of HSFO from West Asia Trading LTD at a price of 211,000 dollars. The goods were delivered by the vessel MT Petro-Ocean (formerly MT Niovi, IMO: 9292498). During this deal, Nosazan Kaveh used an Iranian front company, Petromoj Arman Kish, to complete the purchasing transaction.

MT Petro Ocean (MT Niovi) has a dark history: In 2020, two million barrels of Iranian oil loaded on MT Niovi were secretly sold and transferred to MT Oman Pride, without the authorization or oversight of the owner ASB Group, a Turkish company designated for brokering oil on behalf of IRGC-Quds Force. This transaction was conducted without intent to return the profits to its rightful owners, ASB Group and IRGC. As a result, the vessel was detained by the IRGC Navy in May 2023

The IRGC's oil export scheme is not mere sanction evasion. It is a multi-faceted empire built on various tactics of manipulation. It operates a sophisticated system by deliberately obscuring oil origins and often vessel identities, through falsified documentation and STS transfers. This, however, is not a one-man job; it is a coordinated network of port agents, management companies, charterer companies, and vessel masters who knowingly misrepresent information. By exploiting these vessels, the IRGC continues to generate revenue that directly funds the threatening, destabilizing activities of a designated terrorist organization. As long as the IRGC's calculated and deceptive fleet network remains in the shadows, it will continue to do so.